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Abstract 
 
We focus on the methods used in analyzing broadcast interviews with economists on Morning 
Ireland, a prominent Irish radio news programme. Few would doubt that economists have taken a 
prominent role as experts on policy issues (Carrick-Hagenbarth and Epstein 2012, p.45) and some 
contend that no other social science discipline has gained such prominence (Schneider and 
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Kirchgassner 2009, p.324). This paper comes from a larger research project, which uses a tailored 
methodological approach, incorporating a number of analytical methods. Keller (2011, p.63) has 
argued that a tailored methodological approach is often required to give special consideration to the 
‘knowledge side’ of discourse (Keller, 2011, p. 63). In this broader methodological approach, we 
draw on corpus linguistic techniques to identify features of the overall corpus and help identify 
passages for closer analysis (McEnery & Hardie, 2011), on methods of media interactional analysis 
(for example, Hutchby, 2011) to understand the context of radio broadcast interviews, and 
approaches in discursive psychology (Edley and Wetherell, 1997; Potter and Wetherell, 1987) to 
tackle issues of expert identity construction. This paper will focus on an element of this overall 
methodology, namely the issues of expert identity construction, and more specifically, how an 
expert identity is legitimised through their discourse. In common with Critical Discourse Analytical 
approaches (Fairclough, 2010; Wodak & Meyer, 2009) we find a critical sociological understanding 
of context useful, but also find it essential to understand the world of economists and to be informed 
by their profession’s peculiarities (Fourcade, 2009).     
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Introduction 
This paper analyses the performance of economics expertise on the main radio news show in 
Ireland. It does this through an analysis of interviews with three well-known economics experts. 
Before proceeding to the analysis of the data a very brief guide to recent economic history in 
Ireland is provided in way that also gives the reader an understanding of the dominance of 
neoliberalism in Ireland’s economics discourse.  We then provide an overview of some of the issues 
regarding economics expertise and the media in contemporary society with a special emphasis on 
the responses to the Great Recession of 2008. These two background sections allow us then to 
concentrate on analysing discourse from three expert economists in interviews on national radio in 
Ireland. Our analysis highlights two features of economics discourse that we think to be particularly 
important in legitimising economics expertise. The first we call ‘Judgement as Academic’ in 
reference to the way the economics experts point rather skilfully to the need to listen to their 
expertise. The second way in which economics expertise legitimate their authority, called by us 
‘Markets as Judgement’, is rather paradoxical in that it stresses the wisdom of markets rather than 
experts but skilfully deployed by our economists reinforces their role as experts in reading what the 
markets are saying.  We conclude with some implications of our interpretations for understanding 
how economics expertise operates.  
 
The economy and neoliberalism in Ireland   
The 1980s appear to be a pivotal moment in Ireland’s economic history, with the turnaround in 
economic performance towards the end of this decade being referred to as a ‘miracle’ (Honohan 
and Walsh 2002, p.1) and this success a key resource of neoliberal imaginaries of the Irish economy 
(O’Rourke and Hogan, 2013). 
In the first half of the 1980s the Irish economy was performing dismally. Inflation was in excess of 
20%, the current account deficit was 15% of GNP, and unemployment was 16% by 1986 (Honohan 
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and Walsh 2002, p.8). This period of economic failure saws an increased prominence of Irish 
economists in societal discourse, and these economist had a capitalist liberal approach to the market 
mechanism in their dominant discourse at the time (Pratschke 1985, p.149). The public address by 
the then Taoiseach of Ireland, Charles Haughey, in January 1980 (Aldous 2007) had a decidedly 
neoliberal tone.  This emerging neoliberalism focussed on ‘marginalist thinking’ (O’Malley 1986, 
p.480) in the UK and the US and to most economists’ commentary in these countries to advocate 
lower taxes, reductions in public expenditure, and a focus on cost control.. Similar policies were 
been advocated in Ireland in the 1980s. The adoption of neoliberalism in Ireland should perhaps not 
have been a great surprise: O’Malley (1986, p.479) suggested that ‘most economists in Ireland tend 
to borrow heavily from contemporary thinking in the United States and the United Kingdom’. The 
1980s saw neoliberalism become established as the mainstream economics ‘thinking’ in western 
economies through waves of deregulation and privatisation (Schneider and Kirchgassner 2009, 
p.324). 
 
The economic malaise of the Irish economy persisted until 1986 leading to commentators 
suggesting that the Irish economy had reached ‘nadir’ (Economist Intelligence Unit 1992, p.6). To 
correct this situation, the incoming government in 1987 adopted a decidedly neoliberal policy of 
severely tightening fiscal policy through large cuts to government expenditure (Honohan and Walsh 
2002, p. 15). This policy shift, in a more European influence than neoliberal move, which was 
facilitated by the social partnership agreements reached with trade unions and political consensus 
between government and the main opposition party, Fine Gael, on economic policy which meant 
neoliberalism became institutionalised in economic policy and more rigorously enforced. Along 
with this policy change came an improving international economic environment, demographic 
changes and favourable exchange rate develops  allowed for a surprisingly quick turnaround in 
economic performance (Barry, 1999) and would  turn Ireland from one of the poorest to one of the 
higher income countries in the EU (IMF 2010).  
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The prolonged period of economic growth that the Irish economy enjoyed in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s, popularly referred to as the Celtic Tiger (Chari and Bernhagen 2011), stood in stark 
contrast to ‘the bad old days’ of Irish economic performance (Phelan 2007, p.38). Phelan argues 
that the modernisation discourse of the Celtic Tiger was used to construct the Irish economy ‘as a 
case of neoliberal hegemony’ (2007, p.42) and that prominent social actors used the Celtic Tiger as 
a rhetorical device in validating a neoliberal economic policy for the Irish economy. This Celtic 
Tiger discourse also served to diminish the prominence of alternative economic discourses within 
Irish public life. Keynesian economics, for example, which was introduced to Ireland as recently as 
the 1970s (Haughton 2011), was implicitly constructed as inferior to the neoliberal norm that was 
being presented by figures such as the then Irish finance minister, Charlie McCreevy, during the 
heady days of the Celtic Tiger (Phelan 2007, p.38) and subsequently (O’Rourke and Hogan, 2014). .   
 
The economic recession that the Irish economy endured as its economic fortunes reversed in 2008 
initially left some commentators scrambling for reasons as to how the Irish economic miracle could 
have ended so abruptly. It has ‘prompted some professional reflections about the roles and 
responsibilities of the country’s financial journalists’ (Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 2010, p.5), as well as 
a seismic shift in the Irish political landscape (Gallagher and Marsh 2011). However, although one 
might have expected reflection of the dominance of neoliberalism in Irish economic discourses, this 
largely did not happen.  The ‘strange non-death of neoliberalism’ observed internationally (Crouch, 
2011) was perhaps particularly strong, as many commentators argue that ‘the Irish government has 
addressed the crisis by following neoliberal principles’ (Mercille 2014, p.18). Even the large-scale 
socialisation of private debt in September 2008 was argued for in, somewhat strained, neoliberal 
language (O’Rourke and Hogan, 2014). Perhaps the ‘celebration of neoliberal values during the 
Celtic Tiger years was so extensive in Irish society that it partly accounts for the relative lack of 
protest in Ireland compared to other European countries since 2008’ (Mercille 2014, p.25). By the 
time the consequences of the economic recession became a reality, such as increased 
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unemployment, the ‘Irish people had been left somewhat unaware of economic alternatives, which 
impeded popular resistance to troika (IMF, ECB and European Commission) prescriptions’ 
(Mercille 2014, p.25). Neoliberals were certainly busily reconstructing their version of how the 
crisis came about and how it might be overcome in a similar manner to Ireland’s 1987 recovery 
(O’Rourke and Hogan, 2013). Indeed the incumbent saw the crisis as a reason to drop one of the 
major non-neoliberal policies of Ireland’s economic miracle and ended social partnership (Hogan 
and Timoney, 2016).  Despite the great change in Irish politics in the 2011 election, which saw the 
party that oversaw the crisis and the initial responses to it reduced from its long dominant role in 
Irish politics to third place, the main beneficiary was not the left but Chancellor Merkel’s sister 
European People’s Party, Fine Gael. While the new government included an enlarged Labour Party, 
austerity, both Europe-wide and in Ireland, was the most powerfully advocated solution to all 
problems.    
 
Economics Experts, the media and the Great Recession 
Historically, it was the preserve of academics to confine their research output to the closed circles 
of academic publications and the role of others, like consultants and public policy officials, to 
disperse knowledge more widely (Fincham et al. 2008). More recently, experts have been 
interacting with society more directly, either because of institutional pressure to popularise 
academic knowledge or from a heightened sense of providing a public good (Fourcade 2009; Rowe 
and Brass 2008). The media has provided the platform for this increased engagement by experts 
with society, so allowing the media to continue to occupy a powerful position in knowledge 
circulation (Boyce 2006). The media is reliant on experts to inform their audience of issues of 
societal importance and to provide them with the knowledge that wider society consumes. Experts 
are reliant on the media to give them a platform. This altered relationship has also caused a change 
in identity of experts as they find themselves increasingly being called upon ‘to be something like 
‘mediators’, bringing ideas quickly and decisively into public focus, brokering their ideas in the 
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context of different spheres of influence’ (Osborne 2004, p.435). The emergence of a mediator 
identity as part of an academic’s overall identity appears to have been influenced by the emergence 
of intermediaries or ‘knowledge brokers’ (Meyer 2010). The duty of such knowledge brokers is to 
assist in the dissemination of knowledge from knowledge producers to a society (Meyer 2010, 
p.120). This identity of mediator intellectual ‘is interested above all in ideas; not the ‘big ideas’ of 
the epoch of ‘grand narratives’ but ideas which are going to make a difference, and especially ideas 
which are ‘vehicular’ rather than ‘oracular’’ (Osborne 2004, p.441). 
 
The onset of the Great Recession has served as an impetus for academic critique of both the field of 
economics and the role of the media (Berry 2013; Puhringer and Hirte 2013; Rafter 2014). Much of 
the critique of the media has focused on the role of sourcing, specifically the sourcing of elites in 
the production of financial and economic news (Berry 2013). The role of elite sourcing could be 
seen as helping to reinforce the dominant economic discourses, such as neoliberalism in Ireland, 
within societies. The gatekeeper role that the media plays selecting sources is key to the economic 
discourses that become normalised, as selected sources ‘receive mass exposure and potentially have 
the opportunity to control how wider debate is framed (Rafter 2014, p.599). Fahy, O’Brien, and Poti 
(2010) highlighted the key role of elite sources within Ireland and the intertwined relationship 
between key stakeholders within society, such as journalists, bankers, and property developers. 
Rafter (2014) analysed the role of commentators used by the Irish media and how they constructed 
the economic crisis. Tracy (2012) identified sourcing as a key factor in how US media constructed 
the reasons for the Greek financial crisis, helping to construct the crisis as a failure of the Greek 
people rather than of free market policies. Berry (2013) demonstrates how there was a generally 
positive response to the bank bailout in the UK, and reluctance, or ignoring, of nationalisation. 
Indeed, any mention of state involvement at all was associated negatively - e.g. as meddling (p.263-
4). Berry (2013) also found that the pre-dominant discourse within the UK media reporting of 
economic and financial coverage was a free market, neoliberal economic discourse. Both the term 
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neoliberalism and the relationship between it and economics deserve some care (Jessop, 2013; 
Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009). Nevertheless this strength of neoliberalism in debates on the economy 
appears to be re-enforced by the elite sourcing of the media, as the sources used tend to have similar 
opinions due to the small and inter-connected nature of the elite circles from where the sources are 
derived (Hoynes 2002). This use of a narrow range of  sources and their elite nature (Maesse, 205) 
can limit the important democratic role of the media (Rafter 2014, p.606). 
 
Following the financial crisis of 2007, many have pointed to 'a growing distrust in economic 
research and the economics profession' (Puhringer and Hirte 2013, p.2) given the collapse of growth 
and what the public perceived as a silence of warning of an impending economic crisis. This 
perceived inability of the economics profession to predict or warn society of a major economic 
event has led to much criticism of the profession with Colander et al. (2009, p.250) arguing that the 
financial crisis demonstrated 'a systemic failure of the economics profession', and Schneider and 
Kirchgassner (2009, p.322) suggesting that the crisis should lead to 'a quite clear systematic 
criticism of the economics profession'. Within Ireland, the economists, particularly those in the 
ESRI and academia, may have lost less legitimacy given both their public warnings, the then 
governments  reject of those warnings  and the infamous attack on them during the boom by the 
then Irish prime minister Bertie Ahern (RTE-News, 2000 and 2007 the clip are available through 
you tube  see  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=THWbrFy5NWM and 
 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfjGSfuSQpA). The alleged passive role of economists in the 
immediate aftermath of the crisis has also been criticised; what Ahmia (2008) called 'the silence of 
economists'. This negative construction of experts may present further difficulty for their discourse 
to gain societal legitimacy. 
 
Another criticism of economists that has come to public attention, and been the subject of some 
public scrutiny, since the crisis is a potential conflict of interest economists’ may have between the 
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public policy advice they give and the lucrative industry connections they may have. Carrick-
Hagenbarth and Epstein (2012) identified 15 prominent economists (from a sample 19) who had 
private financial affiliations and were offering public policy advice between 2005-09. What they 
identify as being particularly troublesome is that it was the norm for economists to not disclose any 
such affiliations (Carrick-Hagenbarth and Epstein, 2012, p.59). Such conflicts have lead some to 
suggest that economists may not be willing to speak out for economic policy that may damage the 
financial performance of the companies they are affiliated with, such as firms involved in 
derivatives and hedge funds (Hodgson 2009, p.15). It has also lead to calls for such conflicts to be 
avoided or at least made transparent to the general public (Carrick-Hagenbarth and Epstein 2012).     
 
 
Performing economics,  expertise and legitimization   
So given the times we are it is not surprising that there is a defensive aspect to the  performance of 
economists  Legitimization is related to self-defence, since it seeks to provide reasons or acceptable 
motivations that could be criticised by others (Breeze 2012). However, it is usually perceived as a 
more complex term than self-defence in that it tends to involve a number of different interrelated 
discourses and does not necessarily respond to a direct or specific accusation (Breeze 2012, p.4). 
Although the topic of legitimacy has received some attention within discourse research (Vaara, 
Tienari, and Laurila 2006; Van Leeuwen, 2007), it has been less extensively studies than other 
topics such as persuasion (Breeze 2012).  However, the increasingly popular use of discursive 
approaches in social science research (Van Dijk 1997) has been reflected in the area of legitimation 
given the more recent trend towards research focusing on legitimation from a discursive perspective 
(Suddaby and Greenwood 2005; Vaara 2014; Van Leeuwen 2007).  
 
Vaara et al. (2006)  suggest that ‘the market’ tends to act as the ultimate authority in legitimising 
global capitalism, through things like an increasing share price being used as a means to 
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legitimisation decisions. Nationalism is also frequently used as an important discursive tool during 
struggles to legitimise within discourses. Hodge and Coronado (2006) discuss how the opening of 
the Mexican market to MNCs was legitimised through a discourse of economic reform that 
emphasised the national interest of Mexico to these reforms. Billig (1995) argues that people, in 
what he refers to as ‘banal nationalism’, use such nationalism as a discursive device constantly in 
everyday discussions. This type of nationalism is pervasive within discourses, and can be used as a 
subtle legitimising tool.  
 
The diverse nature of legitimation and how it is constructed means that there is a variety of 
strategies that can be used for legitimation, delegitimation, and relegitimation (Vaara 2014).. Van 
Leeuwen (2007), building on previous work (Van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999) outlines a framework 
for analysing how discursive strategies are used for legitimation. In this framework there are four 
major categories of legitimation strategy: authorisation, moral evaluation, rationalisation, and 
mythopoiesis. Authorisation grants legitimation through reference to authority of tradition, custom 
or law, or from persons in whom institutional authority is vested. Moral evaluation grants 
legitimation through reference to a value system. Rationalisation grants legitimation through 
reference to the goals and uses of institutionalised social action. Mythopoesis grants legitimation 
through narratives whose outcomes reward legitimate actions (Van Leeuwen 2007, p.92). Vaara 
(2014) utilised Van Leeuwen’s framework in researching institutional legitimation during the 
Eurozone crisis. Vaara identified three types of legitimation strategies: Position-based authorisation; 
Knowledge-based authorisation focusing on economic expertise; rationalisations concentrating on 
economic argument.   
Our focus on legitimatisation in this paper is in a very particular micro–context the interaction in 
radio interviews with expert economics in Ireland.   
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Radio news interviews with economists  
This paper focuses on how economists’ expertise is performed by analysing how interviews  
construct their discourse and  legitimate them and  their discourse. Given the interactional nature of 
the data the work  draws on the tradition of Potter and Wetherell (1987). In also builds on previous 
work done on radio interactions (Fitzgerald and Housley 2002; Hutchby 2006; Thornborrow 2001) 
and on the analysis of economic discourse on Irish radio (O’Rourke and Hogan 2013; O’Rourke 
and Hogan 2014). We also draw on discourse analytical approaches (Vaara, 2014; Van Leeuwen, 
2007)  to legitimation and apply some of these concepts to our more narrowly focussed data  
A prominent Irish radio show, Morning Ireland, was selected as the data source for this research 
and interviews with three well-known economics experts, Alan Ahearne, John McHale, and Ray 
Kinsella, are analysed.  
 
Alan Ahearne (AA) holds a PhD in Economics from Carnegie Mellon University, is Professor of 
Economics at National University of Ireland at Galway (NUIG) and has served as External Advisor 
to the Strategy, Practice and Review Department of the International Monetary Fund. AA also 
served as Special Advisor to former Minister for Finance, the late Brian Lenihan, from March 2009 
to March 2011. However, the interview under analysis in this paper is taken prior to this 
appointment as Special Advisor. John McHale (JM) JM holds a PhD in Economics from Harvard, is 
Professor of Economics at NUIG and has served as Chairman of the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council 
since July 2012. Ray Kinsella (RK) holds a PhD in Economics from Trinity College Dublin, is 
currently Professor of Banking and Finance in the Smurfit School in University College Dublin, and 
was previously an Economic Advisor to the Department of Industry and Commerce. 
 
Interview 1 was carried out the day after a marked drop in the share price of a number of Irish 
banks, with the discussion focusing on this share price fall and what could be done to stabilise the 
Irish economy. Interview 2 was held amidst increasing speculation that Ireland would require an 
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economic bailout in the near future, given the pronounced increase in borrowing costs that Ireland 
faced and the significantly negative fiscal position it found itself in. Interview 3 comes in the 
immediate aftermath of the bank guarantee, when the Irish state effectively guaranteed the liabilities 
of the major Irish banks.   
 
Judgement as Academic 
This discourse shows the economics experts’ foregrounding their expertise by relying on their 
advanced academic comprehension of economics concepts. This is evidenced through explicit 
referencing of economics concepts and an understanding of how an economy operates or may 
perform in a given scenario. In this discourse, the experts emphasise their expertise as a legitimising 
device.  
 
Extract 1 
 
[00:00:54.01] Gavin Jennings (IR): Does it mean though that if the government is putting more 
money into AIB and Bank of Ireland that it might as well nationalise them? 
[00:01:01.01] Alan Ahearne: Well that's that's a possibility. I mean, it's hard hard to know where 
exactly it is going to go. There is a a government guarantee on all the deposits, so it's in a way, the 
government is already taking this step towards that. Governments around the world have been 
putting up a fight in a sense of trying to bring finance stability and we have seen that war against 
the, em, what 's going on in the financial markets, em, getting worse and worse and it may well be 
that many governments around the world have to nationalise major parts of the banking system. But 
this is about bringing financial stability so whatever it takes. 
 
From Interview 1  by Gavin Jennings  of  Alan Ahearne 20.01.2009. Squared brackets give 
time into interview.  
 
Extract 1, above, opens with the interviewer asking the economist to give the meaning of the 
government action of putting more money into some of the Irish banks, namely AIB and Bank of 
Ireland. In one sense this question is an authorisation of AA in that there appears to be an 
expectancy that he will be able to answer and explain this economic issue. AA then builds on this 
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inferred authorisation by demonstrating a deeper understanding of this issue (‘There is a a 
government guarantee on all the deposits’) and an understanding of the broader context 
(‘Governments around the world have been putting up a fight’). This type of authorisation is 
reflective of the ‘Knowledge-based authorisation’ observed by Vaara (2014), and this example may 
include  an attempt by AA to reinforce his credibility as an expert – what might be called auto-
authorisation. 
 
The opening question also raises the more controversial topic of bank nationalisation with 
connotations of socialist economics. By acknowledging bank nationalisation as a possibility, and 
stressing the difficulty of knowing what exactly it is going to go, AA’s answer turns this into a 
positive economics discussion in which he as an economists can give an expert academic opinion. 
AA could have answered in a way that engaged in the political debate about nationalisation, Rather 
than proceed directly to provide an analysis of the nationalization option AA cleverly focuses 
attention on what his words constructs  as the ultimate policy goal as   ‘financial stability’. This 
avocation of stability is a useful discursive device for AA as it allows him to begin to present the 
achievement of financial stability as key for the Irish economy, and as an important target for Irish 
public policy. The implication may be that financial stability, through whatever policy instrument is 
used, is what should be strived for. This early construction of the importance of financial stability as 
the key policy objective allows AA to rationalise any policy that achieves stability. This is, 
according to AA, the objective by which a proposal of ‘nationalisation’ or any proposal should be 
judged. As AA states, financial stability is worth ‘whatever it takes’. This rationalised position 
allows AA to helps build legitimacy to his argument. If we accept that the financial stability 
argument is in the public good, then to oppose it would to be against the public interest. The 
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importance of this neutralising of opposing opinions is also that it will allow AA, explicitly or 
implicitly, again in the interview to help legitimise other policies that will contribute to financial 
stability. By doing this AA has reduced the issue of bank nationalisation to a technical issue of 
whether or not it is the best way to achieve the financial stability that is obvious (as it has been what 
‘Governments around the world have been putting up a fight’ to achieve in this ‘war’). In this war 
‘again the, em, what’s going in the financial markets’, his academic judgement is important in 
figuring out the exact response.  
 
AA reconstructs the interviewer’s question, and the interviewer allows him to, so that it is no longer 
about bank nationalisation but what can best achieve financial stability and the judgement of what 
policy instrument can best achieve such a goal is constructed as an open question. Indeed what is 
going on is ‘hard to know where exactly it is going to go…’ and it may be that ‘many governments 
around the world have to nationalise major parts of the banking system’. Bank nationalisation is 
constructed as difficult question, that is of international concern, and clearly undesirable as one 
would only do it if you ‘have to’. How to achieve the now clearly established goal of financial 
stability is now constructed as a difficult question that involves ‘parts’ of a clearly complex and 
international ‘system’. For such consideration one might seek expertise and trust in the judgement 
of an academic.  
Extract 2 
[00:00:16.17] Aoife Kavanagh (IR): I know that you agree with a lot with what Morgan Kelly had 
to say yesterday but you don't agree that default is inevitable. So explain to us what will save us 
from default?  
 
[00:00:25.15] John McHale: Ah well, let's start, well first of all I should probably say where I agree. 
We're certainly in a very serious situation, eh, so for instance the cost of insuring Irish debt actually 
rose above Argentinian levels yesterday, eh, and Argentina has sort of a chequered history in terms 
of fiscal performance. So we are in a hole. Eh, Morgan really doesn't see any, any path out of this 
that doesn't involve, eh, some combination of a bailout and/or default. Eh, and, eh, certainly I think 
we're in a situation where at the moment, eh, the markets really don't, eh, see us, eh..., avoiding, eh, 
a bailout. Eh, but I think, eh, that, eh, so with the right, eh, policies, I think, eh, particularly if we 
get the politics, eh, there is a path out of this, eh, that will keep us out of the bailout fund and 
certainly, eh..., avoid default.  
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From Interview  2  by Aoife Kavanagh  of  John McHale 09.11.2010. Squared brackets give 
time into interview.  
 
In Extract 2, above, the IR again infers authorisation onto the economist, JM in this instance. The 
focus of this extract is on the topic of ‘default’, which again can be seen as a topic within the realm 
of economics. By asking JM to ‘explain to us’ this topic, it is inferred that JM has sufficient 
expertise of this topic to be able to provide such explanation. Also interesting here is the plea from 
the IR for JM to explain ‘what will save us from default’. By constructing a default as something 
that people need to be saved from, it instils a negative perception of a default, and perhaps prepares 
the audience for the rationalisation of JM’s argument of how default can be avoided, which is to 
come.  
 
In JM’s turn, it is clear that he quickly asserts the authorisation of economic experts generally, 
through an acknowledgement of that he does agree with 'a lot' of the content of Morgan Kelly's 
article. This serves to reinforce the authoritative position of economists on the domain of economic 
issues. Morgan Kelly and he, as academic experts, agree on much and this agreement validates the 
academic expertise behind their judgement and the authorisation that is implicit with such expertise. 
JM then goes on to subtlety emphasise his authority as an expertise through implicit referencing to 
his knowledge of economic issues. The reference to Argentina demonstrates his understanding of 
the their historical fiscal performance and allows him to subtlety assert authority through historical 
comparison (Vaara 2014, p.509). 
 
JM then offers an interesting turn on how he rationalises his argument of how default may be 
avoided. He does this by eschewing a common rationalisation device used by economists, that 
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being the ultimate authority of the markets (Vaara et al. 2006). He does this through acknowledging 
that the markets don’t see a way for Ireland to avoid a bailout, but he can foresee such a scenario ‘if 
we get the politics’ right. For an economist to contradict the authority of the markets so directly is 
significant given their prominence within the discipline. JM’s rationalisation therefore appears to 
rest on the political scenario, and JM’s expert economist thought that ‘there is a path out of this’. 
What ‘get the politics’ right means is not entirely clear, but perhaps he is insinuating that political 
actors need to ensure they adopt the necessary economic policies, often a bone of contention. 
 
In both extract above we see the performance of economic expertise is achieved through 
authorisation questioning by the interviewing, through making the question into an intellectual 
puzzle, engendering respect for fellow experts, the demonstration of economic knowledge and 
focussing the question on the policy instruments through constructing the policy aims as agreed. 
Interestingly too in these extracts the economist are at war or in disagreement with the market, 
though we expect economists to use the market as a legitimation device as indeed they do in our 
next extracts. 
 
Markets as Judgement  
In these interviews we can see experts utilising the markets as a discursive tool to legitimise policy 
positions and economic forecasts. The markets are referred to, implicitly and explicitly, as the 
ultimate adjudicators as to whether a policy is, or will be, a success or not, through discussion as to 
how they react, or will react, to economic events and policies. Here the economists’ academic 
expertise is emphasised less, with the market being placed in the foreground of the discourse.    
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Extract 3 
[00:03:18.21] Alan Ahearne: Well the critical one is to think about how the Irish economy is going 
to recover.  Where the growth is going to come from. We know it's going to come from exports, it's 
not going to come from, eh, from domestic, eh, demand or the housing market again. How do we 
boost our exports and there's only one way. That is to reduce our wage costs. In in normal times and 
normal recessions, em, they, you could have pay freezes and you would gain competitiveness 
against your competitors and your exports would improve. These are not normal times. We're going 
to have very low, if not falling consumer prices all over the world.  
 
From Interview 1  by Gavin Jennings  of  Alan Ahearne 20.01.2009. Squared brackets give 
time into interview.  
 
Extract 3, above, AA provide a skilful rationalisation of what could be construed as a difficult 
economic argument. AA postulates how the economy will recover, and evokes the broader 
discourses of neoliberalism and global capitalism is arguing that exports will be the driver of future 
recovers – this achieved by an appeal ‘to think about how the Irish economy is going to recover. 
Where the growth is going to come from…’.  Note how this set up as a puzzle of how the 
‘economy’, interpreted as the market, is going to behave. AA knows that his audience will easily 
accept his implicit advocacy of the given the association of high economic growth with exports as 
this characterised the early part of the Celtic Tiger (O’Riain 2000). AA points that growth is ‘not 
going to come from, eh, from domestic, eh, demand or the housing market again’ as he reduces all 
possibilities of domestic demand into the ‘housing market’, magically transforming a clear and 
dramatic failure of a market (the Irish housing market) into an argument for following a reading of 
the market to determine economic policy. In any case, AA seems to be able to rely on an 
established presumption in Ireland of export-led growth (Phelan, 2007), and the fact that he is not 
challenged on this assertion from the interviewer lends this further credence. This lack of challenge 
may be because of his previously established authority in this interview (see Extract 1).  
 
Having argued that exports are the route for recovery, AA then offers a further reading of the 
market that will provide the rationalisation for his policy prescription. AA is quite definite in the 
solution he offers, claiming ‘there’s only one way’, and this one way is to ‘reduce our wage costs’. 
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Other, at least logically available, options are not considered. For example, revenue increases that 
might be achieved through producing more desirable products is not mentioned, presumably on the 
assumption that Ireland is operating as a small producer in a perfectly competitive world. 
Furthermore any alternative methods of reducing costs need not be considered. The requirement for 
wage reduction can, according to AA, be directly read, at least with his expertise vision, from the 
way the market is going  with its ‘very low, if not falling consumer prices all over the word’. Here 
AA expertise is based on his reading of the market and there is no trace of being in war against 
them as there was in the first extract.    
 
A final ingredient is added to naturalize AA’s reading of the market: any other possible readings of 
the market are excluded from the particular situation that Ireland finds itself, by declaring that these 
are extreme times, where AA’s reading is presumably extremely correct: ‘in normal times and 
normal recessions, em, they, you could have pay freezes and you would gain competitiveness 
against your competitors and your exports would improve. These are not normal times. We're going 
to have very low, if not falling consumer prices all over the world...’. The abnormality of times are 
warranted by AA’s reading of a future state of the market in his observation that ‘We're going to 
have very low, if not falling consumer prices all over the world...’. This abnormality serves to 
further rationalise his policy prescription of reducing wages as being a difficult solution for difficult 
circumstances, because rather than claim a reduction in wages as a desirable public policy, AA 
instead positions it as the only route to economic recovery.  
 
 
Extract 4 
[00:01:17.22] Gavin Jennings (IR): And, let’s talk about this third way that they’ve been going in. 
Not the bailout, the buying of the toxic loans that has been talked about but failed of course in the 
U.S. Not the nationalisation that has happened in the UK and in the Benelux countries, ah, with, ah, 
the banks there. But a guarantee. Effectively a guarantee of the banks, em, capital. It’s, it’s a, kind 
of unusual approa- approach. Will it work?  
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[00:01:36.11] Ray Kinsella: Yes I believe it will. To the extent that the Irish, em, financial system 
can, em, control its own destiny, yes I believe it will. And it’s again, it’s reflected in the reaction in 
the markets this morning. Now that reaction is coming against markets that have basically tanked in 
the Far East, em, and in other markets that have opened earlier. So, em, we’re seeing a major 
continued slide in other markets, but a hugely positive response in the Irish market. 
  
From Interview 3 by Gavin Jennings  of  Ray Kinsella 30.09.2008. Squared brackets give time 
into interview.  
 
In Extract 4, above the IR opens with a multi-layered question that includes a quick summary of the 
complex situations worldwide showing that we are in a knowledgeable interview and the 
interviewee can address this complex situation. The IR’s question authorizes RK as an expert with 
its appeal to him to tell us whether the state bank guarantee will work. RK responses  very 
definitively beginning with a firm ‘Yes’, and the qualifications (his belief and his proviso that it will 
work subject only to the extent that anything the Irish financial system can do will work) to this 
answer strengthen, rather than weaken his support for the policy.  In his answer RK evokes the 
market as an ultimate authority (Vaara et al. 2006) to rationalise his assertion that the guarantee will 
work (‘it’s reflected in the reaction in the markets this morning’). RK contrasts the reaction of the 
markets in Ireland with the markets ‘in the Far East’ that have ‘basically tanked’ and he uses this 
contrast to rationalise his assertion that the Irish bailout option, the Bank Guarantee, was correct 
and will work.  RK also reinforces his authority by evoking market reaction ‘in the Far East’, in a 
similar manner as JM evoked Argentina in Extract 2.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
Economics expertise needs to work for societal legitimacy (Maesse 2015) and our economics 
experts’ performances rely on both the Judgement as Academic and  Markets as Judgement 
discourses in their interview performances.  
 
When using Judgement as Academic our economists seem to appeal to the state / nation/ with its  
claims of undisputed objectives for the public good. Vaara (2014: Example 6) found a similar 
nationalist arguments with economic ones. This devotion to the common purposes may allow 
economists claim to be free from particular interest and so speaking with  expertise (Lefsrud & 
Meyer, 2012: 148),  yet the pursuit of particular interest is central to economics’ expertise.  
 
Judgement as Academic   likely benefits from legitimacy goods created in academia (Maesse, 2015) 
and so  the effect of authorization (Vaara 2014;  Van Leeuwan, 2007) and ‘auto-authorization’ is 
important. Eliteness of academic source may also be important (Maesse, 2015), although we have 
not addressed yet in our research.  
 
When using the Judgement as Academic our economists seemed less definitive and stressed the 
puzzling nature of the issue being discussed.  The puzzling nature could justify the need for their 
special knowledge. This doubt and need for expertise seemed somewhat in tension with 
neoliberalism.   Markets as Judgement discourse  is an example of markets as legitimating devices 
highlighted by Pühringer (2015) and Vaara (2014 – market as expert authority). The ideology of 
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neoliberalism seems stronger in the Markets as Judgement discourse. This is in the elevation of the 
market to an expert in itself but also in the way it is used especially by AA. 
 
There is somewhat of a tension between these the Judgement as Academic and  Markets as 
Judgement . Perhaps this is just the case of  an ideological dilemma of the kind that give ideologies 
the ability to engage us  (Billig et al. 1988). Perhaps it is a more troubling feature of the economics 
discourse which mean it requires nationalistic when the Judgement as Academic is invoked.  
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